On blind deference in Open Democracy

In this article, I critically assess Hélène Landemore's new model of Open Democracy, asking whether it requires citizens to blindly defer the decisions mini-public. To address question, I, first, discuss three institutional mechanisms in all which can be read grant democratic control. argue that neither capacity authorize selection mechanism (random sortition), nor lottocratic conception political equality, self-selection deliver form control would insulate Democracy from charge blind deference. then direct democracy Landemore incorporates into her model. Although these devices and, by extension, offer resources for repudiating deference, they also, argue, subvert logic model, rendering predictably unstable. Given deliberative asymmetries between mini-public and citizenry, a high frequency bottom-up challenges is expected throw whole system jeopardy. Thus, challenge lottocrats show how achieved without undermining benefits legislature lot.