Observational learning under imperfect information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Observational learning under imperfect information
The analysis explores Bayes-rational sequential decision making in a game with pure information externalities, where each decision maker observes only her predecessor’s binary action. Under perfect information the martingale property of the stochastic learning process is used to establish convergence of beliefs and actions. Under imperfect information, in contrast, beliefs and actions cycle for...
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Nearly all observational learning models assume that individuals can observe all the decisions that have previously been made. In reality, such perfect information is rarely available. To explore the difference between observational learning under perfect and imperfect information, this paper takes an experimental look at a situation in which individuals learn by observing the behavior of their...
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In real-life, imperfect information is commonly present in all the components of the decision making problem. In decision making problems a DM is almost never provided with perfect, that is ideal decision relevant information to determine states of nature, outcomes, probabilities, etc. We are known that, relevant information almost always comes imperfect. Imperfect information is information wh...
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I study optimal monetary policy when both the central bank and the private sector have imperfect information about the underlying economy. I model forward guidance as providing the central bank’s own forecast on optimal policy conditional on its own imperfect information. When the private sector has rational expectation, it is able to infer the imperfect information held by the central bank fro...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00179-9