Observational learning in large anonymous games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Observational Learning in Large Anonymous Games∗
I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning, an agent’s payoff depends both on the state and on the actions of others. Agents want both to learn the state and to anticipate others’ play. As the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te3014