Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance)....
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In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important market design problems, the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA-)mechanism with responsive str...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001