Nash, Bargaining and Evolution
نویسندگان
چکیده
Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. work on fairness focuses the division a windfall and, importantly, assumes that positions those involved are entirely symmetric. I more complicated strategic settings and find there is strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with so-called Nash bargaining solution. also uncover evolutionary importance comprehensiveness, an often-overlooked feature problems.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy of Science
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0031-8248', '1539-767X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/715778