Multiple large shareholders and earnings informativeness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multiple Large Shareholders and Earnings Informativeness
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to add to our understanding of the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders by examining their impact on the informativeness of firms’ earnings. Design/methodology/approach – We use regression models that relate earnings to stock returns for a sample of 402 French publicly traded firms covered during 2003-2007. Findings – We show that earnings inform...
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Many firms have more than one blockholder, but finance theory suggests that one blockholder should be sufficient to bestow all benefits on a firm that arise from concentrated ownership. This paper identifies a reason why more blockholders may arise endogenously. We consider a setting where multiple shareholders have endogenous conflicts of interest depending on the size of their stake. Such con...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Accounting and Finance
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1475-7702
DOI: 10.1108/14757701111155789