Mr. W. E. D. Allen

W . ALLEN WALLIS Institute of POLITICAL ECONOMY UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

We develop a general theory for the emergence of minority governments in multiparty parliamentary systems using a bargaining model in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn, 1989. We show that generically (i.e. except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of the model’s parameters) minority governments form with strictly positive probability when office utility from cabinet positions is ...

w(E) ≥

W . ALLEN WALLIS Institute of POLITICAL ECONOMY UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

This paper analyzes collective choices in a society with strategic voters and single-crossing preferences. It shows that, in addition to single-peakedness, single-crossingness is another meaningful domain which guarantees the existence of non-manipulable social choice functions. A social choice function is shown to be anonymous, unanimous and strategy-proof on single-crossing domains if and onl...

F/W e+e- INTERACTIONS*

INTRODUCTION The field of e+e-interactions has provided a great deal of excitement in the past few years. 1-9 Primarily, interest has centered around the reaction +-ee-hadrons. This reaction is particularly attractive because we believe in electromagnetic perturbation theory, which implies that the cross section for hadron production is dominated by one photon annihilation of the electron and p...

On e + e − → W + W − → 4f(+γ) at LEP2 ∗

The results on ee → WW → 4f(+γ) obtained by different groups are compared with each other. Differences in the results for the total cross section of up to about 0.6 % are traced back to different ways of implementing the double-pole approximation. Suppported by the BMFT, Bonn, Germany, Contract 05 HT9PBA2