Moral Disagreement and Practical Direction

Moral Intuition, Moral Theory, and Practical Ethics

Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness

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Practical Reasons and Moral ‘Ought’

Morality is a source of reasons for action, what philosophers call practical reasons. Kantians say that it ‘gives’ reasons to everyone. We can even think of moral requirements as amounting to particularly strong or stringent reasons, in an effort to demystify deontological views like Kant’s, with its insistence on inescapable or ‘binding’ moral requirements or ‘oughts.’1 When we say that someon...

D. Loeb Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement

The argument from disagreement is among the most important that has been directed against moral realism.1 Yet, in recent years it has been widely rejected – so widely, in fact, that even those who are sympathetic with irrealism have often found it unconvincing. One reason for this has to do with the fact that newer, more sophisticated versions of moral realism have recently emerged. Some of the...

Moral pedagogy and practical ethics.

Online science and engineering ethics (SEE) education can support appropriate goals for SEE and the highly interactive pedagogy that attains those goals. Recent work in moral psychology suggests pedagogical goals for SEE education that are surprisingly similar to goals enunciated by several panels in SEE. Classroom-based interactive study of SEE cases is a suitable method to achieve these goals...