Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking.
The impossibility theorems that abound in the theory of social choice show that there can be no satisfactory method for electing and ranking in the context of the traditional, 700-year-old model. A more realistic model, whose antecedents may be traced to Laplace and Galton, leads to a new theory that avoids all impossibilities with a simple and eminently practical method, "the majority judgemen...
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iii Acknowledgements I would like to use this space to thank and acknowledge all those who contributed their skill, knowledge, help, and mental and emotional support to make this thesis a reality. I thank Dr. Patrick Phillips for his mentorship and guidance in designing and carrying out this experiment, as well as his patience and support in helping me to analyze and synthesize my findings. I t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.024