Minimal winning coalitions and orders of criticality
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract In this paper, we analyze the order of criticality in simple games, under light minimal winning coalitions. The a player game is based on number other players that have to leave so question becomes pivotal. We show definition can be formulated referring cardinality blocking coalitions or hitting sets for family coalitions; moreover, are related dual game. Finally, propose rank all lexicographically accounting which they critical each order, and characterize ranking using four independent axioms.
منابع مشابه
Power Indices and minimal winning Coalitions
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of m...
متن کاملComplementary cooperation, minimal winning coalitions, and power indices
In this paper, we introduce a new family of simple games, which is referred to as the complementary weighted multiple majority game. For the two dimensional case, we prove that there are at most n+1 minimal winning coalitions (MWC for short), where n is the number of players. An algorithm for computing all the MWCs is presented, with a running time of O(n log n). Computing the main power indice...
متن کامل2 00 9 Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of m...
متن کاملPower indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions
A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a voting situation and are calculated by looking at marginal contributions in a simple game consisting of ...
متن کاملStable Winning Coalitions
We introduce the notion of a stable winning coalition in a multiplayer game as a new system of classification of games. An axiomatic refinement of this classification for three-player games is also presented. These classifications are compared in light of a probabilistic model and the existing literature.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Operations Research
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1572-9338', '0254-5330']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04199-6