MEROKOK DALAM TINJAUAN HUKUM ISLAM (Studi Nash-Nash Antara Haram Dan Makruh)
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set*
We extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a characterization of the Nash set of NTU games, defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from t...
متن کاملNash equilibrium
In game theory, Nash equilibrium (named after John Forbes Nash, who proposed it) is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or...
متن کاملRefinements of Nash Equilibrium
In game theory, “refinement” refers to the selection of a subset of equilibria, typically on the grounds that the selected equilibria are more plausible than other equilibria. These notes are a brief, largely informal, survey of some of the most heavily used refinements. Throughout, “equilibria” means Nash equilibria (NE), unless I state otherwise explicitly. And throughout, I assume that the g...
متن کاملFlag Higher Nash Blowups
In his previous paper [5], the author has defined a higher version of the Nash blowup and considered it a possible candidate for the one-step resolution. In this paper, we will introduce another higher version of the Nash blowup and prove that it is compatible with products and smooth morphisms. We will also prove that the product of curves can be desingularized via both versions.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ALHURRIYAH: Jurnal Hukum Islam (ALHURRIYAH JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC LAW)
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2549-4198,2549-3809
DOI: 10.30983/alhurriyah.v3i1.534