منابع مشابه
Does informative media commentary reduce politicians' incentives to pander?
Elections sometimes give policy-makers incentives to pander, i.e., to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest, even though the policy-maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voter. Pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn, prior to the election, whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest. This ...
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هدف از انجام این تحقیق مشخص کردن موثرترین متد اصلاح خطا بر روی دقت آهنگ و تاکید تلفظ کلمه در زبان انگلیسی بود. این تحقیق با پیاده کردن چهار متد ارائه اصلاح خطا در چهار گروه، سه گروه آزمایشی و یک گروه تحت کنترل، انجام شد که گروه های فوق الذکر شامل دانشجویان سطح بالای متوسط کتاب اول passages بودند. گروه اول شامل 15، دوم 14، سوم 15 و آخرین 16 دانشجو بودند. دوره مربوطه به مدت 10 هفته ادامه یافت و د...
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متن کاملBad Politicians
We present a simple theory of the quality (competence and honesty) of elected officials. Our theory offers three main insights. Low-quality citizens have a ‘comparative advantage’ in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than those of high-quality citizens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty). Hence, voters may find themsel...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The International Journal of Press/Politics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1940-1612,1940-1620
DOI: 10.1177/1940161215627461