Mechanisms of Epistemic Change—Under Which Circumstances Does Diverging Information Support Epistemic Development?

Epistemic Networks for Epistemic Commitments

The ways in which people seek and process information are fundamentally epistemic in nature. Existing epistemic cognition research has tended towards characterizing this fundamental relationship as cognitive or belief-based in nature. This paper builds on recent calls for a shift towards activity-oriented perspectives on epistemic cognition and proposes a new theory of ‘epistemic commitments’. ...

Epistemic Responsibility without Epistemic Agency

This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various “Kantian” views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility, in particular the one proposed by Pamela Hieronymi (2007). I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms...

Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Incommensurability

If I were to believe you are trustworthy just on your say-so, my reasoning would be infected with what is called epistemic circularity. I would be supposing a source is trustworthy by relying on that very source. Generally speaking, we tend to think this is a very bad idea. It is why we don’t bother asking politicians or salesmen whether they are honest. A well-known line of reasoning stemming ...

Epistemic Principles , Epistemic Circularity and the Ultimate Epistemic Goal

In this work we investigate the feasibility of the project of showing that a certain kind of generalisations that philosophers call ‘Epistemic Principles’, which state conditions for the achievement of epistemic goods such as justifications and entitlements, fulfil general conditions for their correctness. First, we identify the veritistic commitments underlying the project; it is argued that s...

Epistemic Dynamics and Protocol Information