Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set

Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set

The stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern imposes credibility on coalitional deviations. Their credibility notion can be extended to cover farsighted coalitional deviations, as proposed by Harsanyi (1974), and more recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). However, the resulting farsighted stable set suffers from a conceptual drawback: while coalitional deviations improve on existing o...

The Farsighted Stable Set by Debraj Ray

Supplement to “ the Farsighted Stable Set ”

There can, of course, be no concessions as regards existence. If it should turn out that our requirements concerning a solution. . . are, in any special case, unfulfillable,—this would certainly necessitate a fundamental change in the theory. Thus a general proof of the existence of solutions. . . for all particular cases1 is most desirable. It will appear from our subsequent investigations tha...

Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an n-player prisoners' dilemma

We examine an n-player prisoners’ dilemma game in which only individual deviations are allowed, while coalitional deviations (even non-binding ones) are not, and every player is assumed to be farsighted enough to understand not only the direct outcome of his own deviation, but also the ultimate outcome resulting from a chain of subsequent deviations by other players. By constructing a purely no...

A Farsighted Stable Set for Partition Function Games

In this paper, we introduce a concept of a farsighted stable set for a partition function game and interpret the union of all farsighted stable sets as the core of the game, to be called the strongcore, which reduces to the traditional core if the worth of every coalition is independent of the partition to which it belongs and the game is adequately represented by a characteristic function. We ...