Marriage Advantages in Perinatal Health: Evidence of Marriage Selection or Marriage Protection?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Marriage and Family
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0022-2445
DOI: 10.1111/jomf.12257