Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible

Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible

I review but don’t endorse Marcus’ arguments that impossible beliefs are impossible. I defend her claim that belief’s objects are, in some important sense, not the bearers of truth and falsity, discuss her dispositionalism about belief, and argue it’s a good fit with the idea that belief’s objects are Russellian states of affairs.

belief function and the transferable belief model

Beliefs are the result of uncertainty. Sometimes uncertainty is because of a random process and sometimes the result of lack of information. In the past, the only solution in situations of uncertainty has been the probability theory. But the past few decades, various theories of other variables and systems are put forward for the systems with no adequate and accurate information. One of these a...

Belief Functions and the Transferable Belief Model

Belief functions have been proposed for modeling someone’s degrees of belief. They provide alternatives to the models based on probability functions or on possibility functions. There are several interpretations of belief functions: the lower probabilities model, Dempster’s model, the hint model, the probability of modal propositions model, the transferable belief model. All these models are un...

Belief and Degrees of Belief

The Transferable Belief Model for Belief Representation

A survey of the use of belief functions to quantify the beliefs held by an agent, and in particular of their interpretation in the transferable belief model.