Managers’ pay duration and voluntary disclosures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managers' pay duration and voluntary disclosures
In this paper, we examine the effect of managers’ pay duration on firms’ voluntary disclosures. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers’ annual compensation to vest. We hypothesize and find that pay duration can incentivize managers to provide more bad news earnings forecasts. This result holds after controlling for the level of stock-based compensation and the endo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0306-686X,1468-5957
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12516