Managerial Ownership, Entrenchment and Innovation

Executive Pay, Hidden Compensation, and Managerial Entrenchment

We consider a “managerial optimal” framework for top executive compensation, where top management sets their own compensation subject to limited entrenchment, instead of the conventional setting where such compensation is set by a board that maximizes firm value. Top management would like to pay themselves as much as possible, but are constrained by the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to a...

Managerial Hedging and Equity Ownership

Managerial Hedging and Equity Ownership Risk-averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm’s cash flow risk by trading in financial markets, but cannot hedge their firm-specific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm-specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater aggregate risk. Such risk substitution gives rise to excessive aggr...

Firm Performance, Entrenchment and Managerial Succession in Family Firms

This paper investigates whether the family status of a company’s top officer affects managerial replacement decisions in UK firms. We report evidence that family firms are characterized by higher levels of board control and weak internal governance in the form of independent company board structures. Consistent with a managerial entrenchment hypothesis, we find evidence that family CEOs are les...

Ownership , Economic Entrenchment and Allocation of Capital February 2008 Johan

In an efficient economy, capital should be quickly (re)allocated from declining firms and sectors to more profitable investment opportunities. This process is affected by the concentration of corporate control, which in turn is affected by market institutions. We employ a panel of 12,000 firms across 44 countries to estimate the functional efficiency of capital markets. We adapt a measure for t...

Ownership Transition, Managerial Short-termism, and Exploratory versus Exploitative Innovation Strategy