Managerial Overconfidence and Share Repurchases
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managerial Timing and Corporate Liquidity: Evidence from Actual Share Repurchases
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Review of Finance
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1369-412X
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2443.2012.01162.x