Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
When managers cannot commit: Capital structure under inalienable managerial entrenchment
CEOs are infrequently fired for poor performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). While financial distress is associated with higher managerial turnover, studies show that incumbent managers often retain control of the firm even in bankruptcy. In this paper, we study how inalienable managerial entrenchment – when it is costly to fire a manager even after poor performance – affects a manager's ability...
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We consider a “managerial optimal” framework for top executive compensation, where top management sets their own compensation subject to limited entrenchment, instead of the conventional setting where such compensation is set by a board that maximizes firm value. Top management would like to pay themselves as much as possible, but are constrained by the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to a...
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With the reform of our property rights system, the maturity of the capital market, and the diversification of corporate financing, the capital structure decision has become the major concern of financial management. There are numbers of researches on how to determine the optimal capital structure, what factors affect the capital structure and what the relationship is like between the capital st...
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The present study is an attempt to find the relationship between capital structure and value of firm and to find the significance of differences in capital structures of different companies – inter and intra industry. Two hypothesis were framed and tested. bivariate correlation technique was used to find the nature of relationship between (i) capital structure and cost of capital, (ii) cost of ...
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While firm growth critically depends on financing ability and access to external capital, the operations management literature seldom considers the effects of financial constraints on the firms’ operational decisions. Another critical assumption in traditional operations models is that corporate managers always act in the firm owners’ best interests. Managers are, however, agents of the owners ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Finance
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0022-1082
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01115.x