Location costs, product quality and implicit franchise contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of International Economics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0022-1996
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-1996(99)00049-5