Local Candidates, Place-Based Identities, and Electoral Success
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract While a large body of literature empirically documents an electoral advantage for local candidates, the exact mechanisms accounting this effect remain less clear. We integrate theories on political geography candidate-voter relations with socio-psychological accounts citizens’ attachment, arguing that citizens vote candidates from their own communities as expression place-based identity. To test our argument, we exploit unique feature German mixed-member system. identify causal candidates’ localness by relying within-electoral-district variation coupled geo-matching strategy level municipalities ( $$\hbox {N}=11175$$ N = 11175 ). The results show voters exhibit strong bias in favor even when they are not competitive. More than only expecting particularistic benefits representatives, appear to community express social
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Political Behavior
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1573-6687', '0190-9320']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09712-y