Learning in Standard-Form Contracts: Theory and Evidence

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract Why are some contractual terms revised continuously while others stubbornly fixed? We offer an account of both change and stickiness in standard-form contracts. hypothesize that drafters (sellers) more likely to revise their standard when they have opportunity learn about the terms’ costs from experience. Consider a warranty. Offering warranty initial period will expose sellers claims malfunction by purchasers, allowing whether it is desirable going forward. When unable this manner, either because fail experiment or term question one where there no increased experience, such be relatively less frequently. While learning occur through various channels, we posit that, all else equal, carry experience frequently, whereas modalities do not contribute stagnation. Our results support hypothesis. Using large sample changes business consumer contracts over seven years, find than those not. These findings further illustrated supported interviews with in-house counsel. The suggest contract evolve time as experientially risks. analysis offers new accounts for use boilerplate, stickiness, has normative implications optimal design default rules product features (JEL codes: K12).

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Contracts: Theory and Evidence

The information systems outsourcing market has seen rapid growth. Companies are increasingly choosing to outsource many of their information systems activities to services firms rather than sourcing them internally. This trend is inconsistent with the predictions of some of the published literature which point to the high costs of using an outside market. These articles, based on transaction co...

متن کامل

Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence

An experiment, consisting of two 15-period runs with 5 = 5 games, was designed w Ž .x to test Stahl’s International Journal of Game Theory 28, 111]13

متن کامل

Standardization of Standard-form Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications

Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction costs. This advantage of standard contracts is increased when there is a second layer of standardization under which multiple firms agree on a standard contract. Trade associations and similar entities often effect standardization of this kind through collective agreeme...

متن کامل

Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications

Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction costs. This advantage of standard contracts is increased when there is a second layer of standardization under which multiple firms agree on a standard contract. Trade associations and similar entities often effect standardization of this kind through collective agreeme...

متن کامل

Discretion in Executive Incentive Contracts: Theory and Evidence

We examine the role of discretion in executive incentive contracts, and explore the trade-offs firms face in choosing among imperfect objective measures of individual performance, more-accurate but non-verifiable subjective measures, and overly broad objective measures of company-wide performance that includes the performance of all agents in the firm. We generate implications and test the mode...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Legal Analysis

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1946-5319', '2161-7201']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laad001