Learning and Complementarities: Implications for Speculative Attacks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Learning and Complementarities: Implications for Speculative Attacks∗
We study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its decision on whether to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime. We show that the learning process gives rise to informational complementarities among traders, which generates coordination motives in their trading and reduces the informational content of the market signal...
متن کاملLearning and Complementarities in Speculative Attacks
We study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision. We show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non-fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions. We show that the central bank can improve the...
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This paper surveys the persian monetary crises due to economic sanctions and speculative attacks that leads to high inflation. Economic sanctions are associated with various forms of trade barriers and restriction on financial transactions. Among the most influential sanctions on Iran's oil export and central bank sanctions are noted that their Aims to reduce Iran's oil revenues and Devaluation...
متن کاملDefending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination
How does the central bank’s incentive to build a reputation affect speculators’ ability to coordinate and the likelihood of the devaluation outcome during speculative currency crises? What role does market information play in speculators’ coordination and the central bank’s reputation building? I address these questions in a dynamic regime change game that highlights the interaction between the...
متن کاملDynamic Speculative Attacks
The paper presents a model of rational Bayesian agents with speculative attacks in a regime of exchange rate which is pegged within a band. Speculators learn from the observation of the exchange rate within the band whether their mass is sufficiently large for a successful attack. Multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks. Various defense policies are analyzed. A t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.972737