Labor clauses in trade agreements: Hidden protectionism?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Labor Clauses in Regional Trade Agreements and Effects on Labor Conditions: An Empirical Analysis
This paper attempts to perform an empirical analysis of the effects of “labor clauses” provided in bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements (or regional trade agreements: RTAs) on working conditions that laborers in the RTA signatory countries actually face, using macro-level data for a wide variety of countries. The paper first reexamines the labor-provision classification of 223 RTAs in for...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of International Organizations
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1559-7431,1559-744X
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-021-09423-3