Known-Key Distinguishing and Partial-Collision Attacks on GFN-2 with SP F-Function

Known-Key Distinguishers on 11-Round Feistel and Collision Attacks on Its Hashing Modes

We present new attacks on the Feistel network, where each round function consists of a subkey XOR, S-boxes, and then a linear transformation (i.e., an SP round function). Our techniques are based largely on what they call the rebound attacks. As a result, our attacks work most effectively when the S-boxes have a “good” differential property (like the inverse function x 7→ x−1 in the finite fiel...

Key-Collision Attacks Against RMAC

compactifications and function spaces on weighted semigruops

chapter one is devoted to a moderate discussion on preliminaries, according to our requirements. chapter two which is based on our work in (24) is devoted introducting weighted semigroups (s, w), and studying some famous function spaces on them, especially the relations between go (s, w) and other function speces are invesigated. in fact this chapter is a complement to (32). one of the main fea...

New Partial Key Exposure Attacks on RSA

In 1998, Boneh, Durfee and Frankel [4] presented several attacks on RSA when an adversary knows a fraction of the secret key bits. The motivation for these so-called partial key exposure attacks mainly arises from the study of side-channel attacks on RSA. With side channel attacks an adversary gets either most significant or least significant bits of the secret key. The polynomial time algorith...

On the Impact of Known-Key Attacks on Hash Functions

Hash functions are often constructed based on permutations or blockciphers, and security proofs are typically done in the ideal permutation or cipher model. However, once these random primitives are instantiated, vulnerabilities of these instantiations may nullify the security. At ASIACRYPT 2007, Knudsen and Rijmen introduced known-key security of blockciphers, which gave rise to many distingui...