منابع مشابه
Killing And Letting Die
Is it worse to kill someone than to let someone die? It seems obvious to common sense that it is worse. We allow people to die, for example, when we fail to contribute money to famine-relief efforts; but even if we feel somewhat guilty, we do not consider ourselves murderers. Nor do we feel like accessories to murder when we fail to give blood, sign an organ-donor card, or do any of the other t...
متن کاملKilling, letting die and euthanasia.
Medical ethicists debate whether or not the moral assessment of cases of euthanasia should depend on whether the patient is 'killed' or 'allowed to die'. The usual presupposition is that a clear distinction between killing and letting die can be drawn so that this substantive question is not begged. I contend that the categorisation of cases of instances of killing rather than as instances of l...
متن کاملActs and omissions: killing and letting die.
Gillon asks what, if any, moral importance resides in the distinction between killing and letting die in the context of medical care. He considers and rejects the acts and omissions doctrine, which claims that actions (killing) resulting in some undesirable end are in general morally worse than failures to act (allowing to die) that have the same result. He also refutes the argument that the ...
متن کاملAn Irrelevant Consideration: Killing versus Letting Die Michael Tooley
Many people hold that there is an important moral distinction between passive euthanasia and active euthanasia. Thus, while the AMA maintains that people have a right "to die with dignity," so that it is morally permissible for a doctor to allow someone to die if that person wants to and is suffering from an incurable illness causing pain that cannot be sufficiently alleviated, the AMA is unwil...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Crítica (México D. F. En línea)
سال: 1982
ISSN: 1870-4905,0011-1503
DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1982.398