منابع مشابه
Privacy-Preserving, Taxable Bank Accounts
Current banking systems do not aim to protect user privacy. Purchases made from a single bank account can be linked to each other by many parties. This could be addressed in a straightforward way by generating unlinkable credentials from a single master credential using Camenisch and Lysyanskaya’s algorithm; however, if bank accounts are taxable, some report must be made to the tax authority ab...
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Consider a buyer with independent additive valuations for a set of goods, and a seller who is constrained to sell one item at a time in an online fashion. If the seller is constrained to run independent auctions for each item, then he would run Myerson’s optimal auction for each item. If the seller is allowed to use the full power of dynamic mechanism design and have the auction for each item d...
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A common feature of financial intermediaries is that the welfare of one borrower is adversely affected by the poor performance of other borrowers. That is, there exists a degree of joint liability among the borrowers of a financial intermediary. This paper provides an explanation for this observation. It demonstrates that in Krasa and Villamil’s [14] formalization of a financial intermediary as...
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Social Protection Discussion Papers are not formal publications of the World Bank. They present preliminary and unpolished results of analysis that are circulated to encourage discussion and comment; citation and the use of such a paper should take account of its provisional character. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and...
متن کاملOptimal dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR via bank accounts
Lately, the problem of designing multi-stage dynamic mechanisms has been shown to be both theoretically challenging and practically important. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing revenue optimal dynamic mechanism for a setting where an auctioneer sells a set of items to a buyer in multiple stages. At each stage, there could be multiple items for sale but each item can only appea...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Common Law World Review
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1473-7795,1740-5556
DOI: 10.1177/1473779518791768