منابع مشابه
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
We study the best guarantees of efficiency approximation achievable by cost-sharing mechanisms. Our main result is the first quantitative lower bound that applies to all truthful cost-sharing mechanisms, including randomized mechanisms that are only truthful in expectation, and only β-budget-balanced in expectation. Our lower bound is optimal up to constant factors and applies even to the simpl...
متن کاملIs Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal ? ∗ ( For the special issue in honor of Lloyd Shapley )
A general approach to the design of budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms is to use the Shapley value, applied to the given cost function, to define payments from the players to the mechanism. Is the corresponding Shapley value mechanism “optimal” in some sense? We consider the objective of minimizing worst-case inefficiency subject to a revenue constraint, and prove results in three differen...
متن کاملShapley-Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
In the discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation (Bahel and Trudeau (IJGT, 2013)), we study the implications of a number of properties that strengthen the well-known Dummy axiom. Our main axiom, which requires that costless units of demands do not affect the cost shares, is used to characterize two classes of rules. Combined with anonymity and a specific stability property, thi...
متن کاملOptimal group strategyproof cost sharing∗
Units of a good are produced at some symmetric cost. A mechanism elicits agents’ willingness to pay for one unit of the good, allocates some goods to some agents, and covers the cost by charging those agents. We introduce the generalized average cost mechanism (GAC) for arbitrary symmetric cost functions. GAC is the only Pareto selection among group strategyproof mechanisms that treat equal age...
متن کاملOptimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Joint use of resources with usage-dependent cost raises the question: who pays how much? We study cost sharing in resource selection games where the strategy spaces are either singletons or bases of a matroid defined on the ground set of resources. Our goal is to design cost sharing protocols so as to minimize the resulting price of anarchy and price of stability. We investigate three classes o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.008