Investment timing and learning externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Investment timing and learning externalities
We study a duopoly model of investment, in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information, and possibly the experience of his rival. Investment costs are private information, and the background signal takes the form of a Poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low. The resulting attrition game has a un...
متن کاملExternalities of Investment, Education and Economic Growth
We present a growth model in which investment in physical capital shows positive externalities which build up knowledge capital. A prerequisite for these spillovers to take place is that a country devotes time to education. Externalities associated with investment need education to raise the stock of knowledge capital. Analyzing the competitive economy we demonstrate that the model may explain ...
متن کاملMachine Replacement, Network Externalities, and Investment Cycles
This paper presents a model where agents decide on the timing of replacement of ageing machines. The optimal replacement policy for an agent is influenced by other agents’ decisions because the productivity of a particular vintage displays network externalities that set in with a lag. In equilibrium, agents follow innovation cycles with a frequency that is lower than optimal, so there is too mu...
متن کاملInvestment , Externalities and Industry Dynamics ( Preliminary , Incomplete )
We provide an alternative theoretical foundation for a number of well known empirical regularities on industry dynamics and product life cycle. We consider a dynamic competitive industry with free entry and exit and time stationary demand where all firms are ex ante identical, have perfect foresight and where there is no uncertainty or information problem. We show that when firms invest in dete...
متن کاملTiming games with informational externalities∗
Many models of timing with irreversible decisions involve informational issues. In patent races, the level of scientific knowledge within a firm evolves randomly, and is unknown to its competitors until a patent has been filed. Nevertheless, competitors can infer some information on this level by observing whether the other firm is still pursuing the new venue. As another illustration, entry/ex...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.006