Institutional Inertia: Persistent Inefficient Institutions in Spain
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Modeling Inefficient Institutions ∗
Many economists and social scientists have recently emphasized the importance of government policies, economic, political and legal institutions, and more broadly, the organization of society.1 There is also mounting evidence that various institutional features are indeed important for economic growth.2 Nevertheless, despite important theoretical advances, we still lack an organizational framew...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Economic History
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0022-0507,1471-6372
DOI: 10.1017/s0022050717000705