منابع مشابه
Private-Information Group Contests∗
We model competing groups when players’ values for winning are private information, each group’s performance equals the best effort (“best shot”) of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. At the symmetric equilibrium, the overall expected best shot unambiguously increases with the number of competing teams, though each team’s performance may increase or decrease....
متن کاملRepeated contests with asymmetric information
The same contestants often meet repeatedly in contests. Behavior in a contest potentially provides information with regard to ones type and can therefore inuence the behavior of the opponents in later contests. This paper shows that if e¤ort is observable, this can induce a ratchet e¤ect in contests: high ability contestants sometimes put in little e¤ort in an early round in order to make the...
متن کاملStrategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests
Competition between groups often involves prizes that have both a public and a private component. The exact nature of the prize not only affects the strategic choice of the sharing rules determining its allocation but also gives rise to an interesting phenomenon not observed when the prize is either purely public or purely private. Indeed, we show that in the two-groups contest, for most degree...
متن کاملAlliance formation in contests with incomplete information
This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is voluntary, players do not reveal private information in the process of alliance formation in any equ...
متن کاملRent-Seeking Group Contests with Private Information
A model of rent-seeking group contest is developed. The contested good is a local public good. Individuals have private information concerning their valuation for the contested good. I restrict effort levels to be dichotomous, allowing me in turn tractability of the equilibria. I show existence of an equilibrium. All contestants exert positive expected effort in equilibrium. From simulation res...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1058-6407
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12105