Information creates relative bargaining power in vendor negotiations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Capacity and Concessions: Bargaining Power in Multilateral Negotiations
Realism and liberalism disagree over the source of bargaining power in international relations. Realists believe that the success of a negotiator is a linear function of the capabilities that its home state possesses. Liberals stress the crucial importance of either the relative salience a country attaches to a contested issue or the importance negotiating governments have to attribute to power...
متن کاملBargaining Power in Repeated Negotiations with Outside Options
For repeated ultimatum bargaining, the Folk Theorem of repeated game theory suggests that there are many equilibria, among them equilibria in which the second mover, say, the buyer, appropriates all the surplus. This paper shows that the presence of outside options in form of alternative trading partners eliminates some of these equilibria by reducing the cope for extracting surplus in repeated...
متن کاملBargaining Power in Electronic Negotiations: A Bilateral Negotiation Mechanism
Bargaining power has a major influence in negotiations. Up to now, a lot of electronic negotiation models have been developed and manifold negotiation challenges have been already addressed, but mainly related to the structure and the process of the negotiation. However, research concerning bargaining power is still inadequate represented. Thus, in order to contribute to the state of the art of...
متن کاملBargaining Delay in Multilateral Trade Negotiations
This paper theoretically and empirically explores bargaining delay in tariff negotiations. By imposing a bargaining structure in an equilibrium trade framework, I derive many testable predictions of delay. I then take my model to the newly compiled GATT (Torquay) tariff negotiation data, which includes detailed (product-level) information of the timing and contents of countries’ (back-and-forth...
متن کاملTwo Level Negotiations in Bargaining over Water
The paper analyzes the impact of a two-level game for water allocations. For a model with two domestic groups and two countries, and with both domestic and international negotiations, Nash bargaining theory is used to derive several propositions on the consequences of different bargaining rules for water allocations. The effect on international negotiations of the ability to commit to having do...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Bottom Line
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0888-045X
DOI: 10.1108/bl-12-2017-0033