منابع مشابه
Information and strategic behavior
Does encouraging trader participation enhance market competitiveness? This paper shows that, when trader preferences are interdependent, trader market power does not necessarily decrease with greater participation, and traders need not become price takers in large markets. Thus, larger markets can be less liquid and associated with lower ex ante welfare. In the linear-normal model, the necessar...
متن کاملMeasuring attention and strategic behavior in games with private information
In experiments, people do not always appear to think very strategically or to infer the information of others from their choices. We report experimental results in games of private information with three information states, which vary in strategic complexity. “Mousetracking” is used to record which game payoffs subjects look at, for how long, to learn more about the thinking process. Subjects o...
متن کاملStrategic Government Behavior and Lobbying Under Asymmetric Information∗
This paper models influence activity as a dynamic game between special interest groups and a policymaker whose preferences are not known with certainty. In case of a single lobby, in a two—period model I show that the policymaker overstates her benevolence in the first period to build a reputation for being “honest” in order to withhold more rents in the second period. The lobby, recognizing th...
متن کاملStrategic behavior in acquiring and revealing costly private information
Article history: Received 13 December 2013 Received in revised form 26 February 2015 Accepted 2 March 2015 Available online 21 April 2015 When an agent has the opportunity to access public information, whether or not to acquire costly private information is a strategic decision. In this case, to study the informativeness of the revealed information, it is essential to consider the processes of ...
متن کاملCan we see inside? Predicting strategic behavior given limited information
⁎ Corresponding authors. SonjaVogt, Charles Efferson, an at Department of Economics, University of Zurich Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Vogt), (C. Efferson), [email protected] (E. Fehr). 1090-5138/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Inc. Al http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.03.003 Article history: Initial receipt 2 October 2012 Final revisio...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.005