Inefficient equilibria in transition economy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
سال: 1999
ISSN: 1026-0226,1607-887X
DOI: 10.1155/s1026022699000308