Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Majority Voting and the Welfare Implications of Tax Avoidance
A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare assessment. We find that the inefficiency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the average level of...
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This paper analyzes the determinants of the welfare state. In a model that integrates majority voting and lobbying by interest groups, we show how the bargaining power of the unskilled and the skilled workers’ lobby affects the size of the welfare state: The more influential the union representing the unskilled, the greater the extent of redistribution. On the other hand, the presence of depend...
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Starting in the late 1970s the Tayloe Murphy Institute, which was one of two institutions that combined to form the Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service in 1987, published a series of monographs on fiscal issues in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Six papers were eventually published. In the mid-1980s the series was discontinued. Many topics had been covered and did not require immediate reexam...
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This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capit...
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Majority voting and social evaluation functions are the main alternatives proposed in the literature for aggregatingindividual preferences. Despite these being very different, this papershows that the ranking of income distributions, symmetric under the same transformation, by S-Gini consistent social evaluation functions and majority voting coincide if and only if the inequality index under co...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 1975
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(75)90016-x