Incentives for voluntary disclosure

VOLUNTARY ASSURANCE OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE∗ by

Debt and Voluntary Disclosure

In attempting to understand voluntary corporate disclosure, many empirical studies have used leverage as an explanatory variable. One reason for an association between debt and disclosure relates to the agency costs of the shareholder-bondholder conflict. By voluntarily disclosing information, shareholders may be able to reduce this agency cost. We provide an additional reason why debt and disc...

Incentives for Public Disclosure by Corporate Insiders†

It is well understood that when corporate insiders trade shares in their firms stock for the sole purpose of maximizing trading profits, they benefit from asymmetric information, and consequently, favor minimal corporate financial disclosure requirements. We demonstrate that when insiders are risk-averse and have other motives for trade, such as liquidity needs, they can actually be harmed by a...

Some Factors that Influence the Quality of Voluntary Disclosure

The purpose of this study is to investigate the factors affecting the evaluation of the quality of voluntary disclosure, given that the factors used in internal research due to having an external source and focusing on the number of disclosures may not be an appropriate criterion for measuring the quality of information disclosure, so, it is necessary to provide new influencing factors on the e...

Do Incentives Destroy Voluntary Cooperation?

We investigate experimentally how explicit performance incentives in incomplete employment contracts interact with agents’ voluntary cooperation in one-shot and repeated gift-exchange experiments. If contracts are incentive compatible, agents choose their bestreply effort and there is no voluntary cooperation. By contrast, there is substantial voluntary cooperation if the contract is not incent...