Incentives for experimenting agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentives for Experimenting Agents∗
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent’s actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian equilibrium (whose structure depends on the parameters) and characterize the set of all equilibrium payo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12039