Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the implementation of social choice rules in environments with externalities. prove impossibility implementing efficient and α-individually rational dominant strategies. that α-core is implementable Nash equilibrium under mild restrictions discuss maximality minimality our results. extend analysis to weakly rules.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1873-1538', '0304-4068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102613