Incentive compatibility and systematic software reuse
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentive compatibility and systematic software reuse
Systematic software reuse has emerged as a promising route to improved software development productivity and quality. Many large corporations have initiated systematic reuse programs, and many reuse frameworks have been developed to guide organizations in these efforts. Yet, in spite of this, systematic reuse in practice has been difficult to achieve. In this article we argue that a key inhibit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Systems and Software
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0164-1212
DOI: 10.1016/s0164-1212(00)00116-3