Imprecise Beliefs in a Principal Agent Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Imprecise Beliefs in a Principal Agent Model∗
This paper presents a principal-agent model where the agent has multiple, or imprecise, beliefs. We model this situation formally by assuming the agent’s preferences are incomplete. One can interpret this multiplicity as limited knowledge of the surrounding environment. In this setting, incentives need to be robust to the agent’s beliefs. We study whether robustness implies simplicity. Under mi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1999
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.166452