Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years on
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentive contracts and unemployment
We study a labour market in which ...rms can observe workers’ output but not their e¤ort, and in which a worker’s productivity in a given ...rm depends on a worker-...rm speci...c component, unobservable for the ...rm. Firms o¤er wage contracts that optimally trade o¤ effort and wage costs. As a result, employed workers enjoy rents, which in turn create unemployment. We show that the incentive ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4331407