Implementers’ work autonomy preferences under pay-for-performance incentives: testing the role of type and framing of incentives

Despite the highlighted positive effects of work autonomy, little is known about what drives street-level bureaucrats’ (SLBs’) autonomy preferences. We propose a combined framework that applies insights from Pay-for-Performance and Prospect Theory to examine whether incentive type (monetary sanctions vs. bonus) framing (negative positive) influence SLBs’ job use data survey experiment 208 healthcare SLBs. Bureaucrats were told their employers required monthly post performance information, then bureaucrats assigned one four possible treatment groups in which we manipulated: (1) boost sanction financial bonus), (2) monetary (positive negative). Results report no general preference for partial autonomy. However, larger potential bonus, more likely SLBs opt preferring full Findings offer practical implications managers’ approach encourage bureaucratic behavior.