Implementations, interpretative malleability, value-laden-ness and the moral significance of agent-based social simulations

The focus of social simulation on representing the world calls for an investigation whether its implementations are inherently value-laden. In this article, I investigate what kind thing implementation is in and consider extent to which it has moral significance. When purpose a computational artefact simulating human institutions, designers with different value judgements may have rational reasons developing implementations. provide three arguments show that amount taking stands via artefact. First, meaning not homogeneous among users, indicates simulations high interpretive malleability. place malleability as condition be metaphorical vehicle world, allowing about institutional expected simulate. Second, involves distinguishing between malfunction representation gaps, reflect role how or remain coherent models constitute single implementation. Third, akin Kroes’ (Kroes, Technical artefacts: creations mind matter: philosophy engineering design, Springer, Dordrecht, 2012) techno-symbolic artefacts, artefact’s effectiveness relative hinges only functional structure, but also meaning. Meaning, just technical function, makes morally appraisable purpose. Schelling’s model ethnic residential segregation example,