IMF conditionality and central bank independence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The normativity of numbers: World Bank and IMF conditionality
Good governance reforms aim at transforming African state bureaucracies into efficient, transparent, and accountable institutions. These policies are inserted into the national administrative apparatus by means of conditions attached to the financial support of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although the conditions exactly match the priorities of these international f...
متن کاملIMF Conditionality
This paper presents a principal-agent model of IMF conditional lending, in the aftermath of a “capital-account” liquidity crisis. We show that traditional ex-post conditionality can be e¤ective in safeguarding the Fund’s resources, allowing for the provision of e¢cient emergency lending and reducing ine¢cient ex-ante credit rationing if the capital out‡ow which triggers the crisis is not excess...
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New monetary literatures widely concentrates on the importance of institutional arrangements in the effectiveness of monetary policy. The debate regarding the optimal institutional design of central banks, independence and conservatism are usually considered to be the most important ingredients for a stable and successful monetary policy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to deal with the...
متن کاملExternal Comments and Contributions on IMF Conditionality
The IMF pretty much argues that all is well with the conditionally contained in the programs it supports and sees no reason to change it. The recent report by the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission in stark contrast argues that conditionality doesnt work and should be abandoned. Which of them is right? The answer is neither of them. Undoubtedly, IMF conditionality has its ...
متن کاملA public choice perspective of IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality ∗
The paper explains IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality stressing changes in relative bargaining power of different stakeholders over time. It applies public choice theory to explain the interests of the institutions’ member states, its borrowers and staffs as well as private actors attaching their money to the IFIs’ programs. Using panel data for 43 countries between 1987–99 it is sho...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0176-2680
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.03.002