How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy?

Corruption and the Shadow Economy

This paper develops a simple framework to analyze the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their implications for the official economy. In a model of self-selection with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, we show that the entrepreneurs’ option to flee to the underground economy constrains a corrupt official’s ability to introduce distortions to the economy for private gains. The un...

Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis

Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a crosssection of 120 countries and a panel of 70 countries for the period 1994-2...

The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States

Theoretically, this paper draws on political agency theory to formulate hypotheses. Empirically, it shows that political institutions have a role in explaining the prevalence of political corruption in American states. In the states, a set of democracies where the rule of law is relatively well established and the confounding effects of differing electoral systems and regimes are absent, instit...

Institutions and the Political Economy of Corruption in Developing Countries

Corruption, Shadow Economy and Income Inequality: Evidence from Asia

Corruption, Shadow Economy and Income Inequality: Evidence from Asia A number of recent studies for Latin America show that as the size of the informal economy grows, corruption is less harmful to inequality. We investigate if this relationship is equally compelling for developing countries in Asia where corruption, inequality and shadow economies are considerably large. We use Panel Least Squa...