HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

Horizontal mergers in the presence of vertical relationships

We study welfare effects of horizontal mergers under a successive oligopoly model and find that downstream mergers can increase welfare if they reduce input prices. The lower input price shifts some input production from costinefficient upstream firms to cost-efficient ones. Also, the lower input price makes upstream entry less attractive, reduces the number of upstream entrants, and decreases ...

Know The Capacity Closure Analysis In Horizontal Mergers

The U.S. antitrust agencies have long evaluated mergers in homogeneous product markets to determine “whether the merged firm will find it profitable unilaterally to suppress output and elevate the market price.”[1] But the U.S. Department of Justice had not publicly disclosed a formal economic method to analyze output suppression concerns until 2007, when it required two large newsprint manufac...

Horizontal mergers with free entry

We consider the impact of horizontal mergers in the presence of free entry and exit. In contrast to much of the previous literature on horizontal mergers, our model yields predictions that seem intuitively reasonable: with only moderate cost synergies mergers of a small number of industry participants are beneficial (even under quantity competition), there is no “free rider problem” in that ins...

Horizontal Bank Mergers : Issues and

Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis

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