Harsanyi support levels solutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We introduce a new class of values for TU-games (games with transferable utility) level structure, called LS-games. A structure is hierarchical where each corresponds to partition the player set, which becomes increasingly coarse from trivial containing only singletons grand coalition. The values, Harsanyi support levels solutions, extend solutions As an important subset these we present weighted Shapley as further result. this LS-games and contain value special case. Axiomatizations studied classes are provided.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1573-7187', '0040-5833']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09827-y