Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Harmful signaling in matching markets
Some labor markets have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms, e.g. the signaling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the e¤ect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between rms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over rms: each worker has typical commonly known preference...
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We evaluate the e ect of costless preference signaling in two-sided matching markets between rms and workers. We consider a game of incomplete information with rm segments. Workers agree on the ranking of rms across segments, but have idiosyncratic and uniformly distributed preferences within segments. Firm preferences over workers are idiosyncratic and uniformly distributed. Each worker can se...
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Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches ...
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As in the proof of Proposition 1, we denote a permutation that changes the ranks of w and w′ in a firm preference list as ρ : (..., w, ..., w′, ...)→ (..., w′, ..., w, ...) and construct preference profile θ′ ∈ Θ from θ∗ as follows: • firm f ’s preferences are the same as in θ∗: θf = θ∗, • workers w and w′ are exchanged in the preference lists of firms −f : ∀f ′ ∈ −f, we have θf ′ = ρ(θf ′), • ...
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We analyze a dynamic search and matching model with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. Randomly paired agents go through an evaluation phase before they discover each other’s types and decide to match or not. Before deciding to enter this phase, agents can send a cheap-talk message about their type to their partner. We provide conditions for this communication to be informativ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1707304