Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences

When dividing a “manna” ? of private items (commodities, workloads, land, time slots) between n agents, the individual guarantee is welfare each agent can secure in worst case other agents’ preferences and actions. If manna nonatomic utilities are continuous (not necessarily monotone or convex) minmax utility, that our agent’s best share partition manna, guaranteed by Kuhn’s generalization divide choose. The larger maxmin utility—of partition—cannot be even for two agents. If, all more better than less (or more), new bid choose rules offer guarantees letting agents smallest largest) size they find acceptable. Funding: A. Bogomolnaia H. Moulin acknowledge support from Basic Research Program National University Higher School Economics. Moulin’s research was also supported Chaire Blaise Pascal Region Ile-de-France, 2020-21.